The Seven-Year Itch: California Labor Code Section 2855 by Blaufarb, Jonathan
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 6 | Number 3 Article 5
1-1-1984
The Seven-Year Itch: California Labor Code
Section 2855
Jonathan Blaufarb
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jonathan Blaufarb, The Seven-Year Itch: California Labor Code Section 2855, 6 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 653 (1984).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol6/iss3/5
The Seven-Year Itch':




The ability of competent persons to freely enter into enforce-
able contractual relations is part of the foundation for the
workings of a commercial society.2 However, public policy3
considerations have resulted in legislative restrictions on free-
dom of contract in certain areas of the law. The legislative pur-
pose of protecting employees has made employment contracts
an area subject to a wide range of federal and state laws.4
Section 2855 of the California Labor Code' expresses a public
policy consideration which overrides freedom of contract. By
applying a seven-year limitation to the enforceability of a per-
sonal service contract,6 the legislature has determined that the
importance to the general welfare of an employee's ability to
bind himself to a lengthy contract is outweighed by the ability
of an employee to extricate himself from a lengthy contract.
The theory behind limiting the duration of an employment
contract is that circumstances will change over the course of
the agreement and may vary greatly from those existing at the
commencement of services. These circumstances may involve
personal, economic, and social considerations,7 especially a
rise in the employee's worth to the employer as a result of in-
creased experience, talent, and skill. Section 2855 reflects the
1. The U.S. Census Bureau has found that the "seven-year itch" in marriages is
more than myth; the median duration of a United States marriage is seven years.
'Seven-Year Itch' Called a Reality, San Francisco Chron., July 2, 1984, at 2, col. 5.
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A., University of California at Berkeley, 1979.
2. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1-3, at 5 (2d ed. 1977).
3. One definition of public policy is: "[tIhe principles under which the freedom of
contract or private dealings is restricted by law for the good of the community."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1041 (5th ed. 1979).
4. CALAIv & PERILLO, supra note 2, § 1-3, at 5.
5. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 1974).
6. See id.
7. See infra text accompanying note 76.
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legislative determination that after seven years an employee
should be able to reassess his employment situation, change
employers or occupations, and be in a position to negotiate
freely with a present or new employer for compensation com-
mensurate with his fair market value.
Due to the financial structure and contractual practices of
the entertainment industries, artists' employment contracts
are frequently renegotiated or amended.8 The resulting con-
tractual arrangements often entail an extension of the employ-
ment relationship. Since these dealings often occur during the
term of a present employment agreement, this practice raises
the question of whether the renegotiated, amended, or modi-
fied agreement constitutes a "new" contract which would start
the running of a new seven-year limitation, or whether the new
agreement merely extends the original contract. The enforce-
ability of the contract under section 2855 will depend on the
date from which the seven-year period is measured.
The issue of how to characterize mid-term contractual modi-
fications-as either extensions of existing contracts or new
agreements-may be resolved by determining whether the em-
ployee is absolutely guaranteed an open-market break at least
once every seven years after the beginning of the employment
relationship. (An open-market break, as used here, signifies
the interval following the termination of a contractual commit-
ment when an employee is free to negotiate for his services on
the open market.) If the employee is guaranteed an open-mar-
ket break, a renegotiated or amended agreement which ex-
tends the employment period beyond seven years would be
rendered unenforceable, regardless of whether or not it was
freely entered into by the employee.
While section 2855 may have a powerful effect on an artist
and his employer, there is little case law interpreting the stat-
ute.9 This is because questions involving the statute arise pri-
marily in entertainers' contracts, and very few contract
8. See infra text accompanying notes 53-57.
9. In addition to the cases discussed in this note, § 2855 has been cited in several
other California court opinions. However, none of these cases is particularly helpful in
resolving the mid-term extension issue. See MCA Records, Inc. v. Newton-John, 90
Cal. App. 3d 18, 153 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1979); LeMat Corp. v. American Basketball Ass'n, 51
Cal. App. 3d 267, 124 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1975); LeMat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 80
Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969); Benane v. International Harvester Co., 142 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 874,
299 P.2d 750 (1956); Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Brodel, 31 Cal. 2d 766, 192 P.2d 949
(1948); Autry v. Republic Prods., Inc., 30 Cal. 2d 144, 180 P.2d 888 (1947).
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disputes in the entertainment industry are litigated.'0 Litiga-
tion is often inimical to the interests of both parties. The short-
lived nature of entertainment careers makes it imperative for
the artist to maximize available public exposure; even a brief
hiatus from the limelight may diminish or destroy the momen-
tum of a career." An artist in the courtroom is neither advanc-
ing his own career nor making money for his employer. The
resulting lack of precedent necessitates a close examination
not only of reported and unreported cases, but also of policy
considerations in order to resolve questions involving section
2855.
This note briefly discusses the history of the statute and then
examines the economic realities and accepted practices of the
entertainment industry which generate issues involving sec-
tion 2855. The primary focus of the note is the effect of section
2855 on mid-term contractual agreements. This issue will be
discussed in the context of singer Melissa Manchester's efforts
to free herself from a series of contracts with Arista Records, 2
with emphasis on the seminal case interpreting section 2855,
De Haviland v. Warner Brothers.3 The note then evaluates
the alternative methods of interpreting section 2855 and recom-
mends a new statutory provision designed to provide a useful
framework for interpreting section 2855.
Ii
California Labor Code Section 2855
California Labor Code section 2855 provides:
A contract to render personal services ... may not be enforced
against the employee beyond seven years from the commence-
ment of service under it. Any contract, otherwise valid, to per-
form or render service of a special, unique, unusual,
extraordinary, or intellectual character, which gives it peculiar
10. See Frackman, The Failure to Pay Wages and Termination of Entertainment
Contracts in California, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 333 (1979); Note, Statutory Minimum Com-
pensation and the Granting of Injunctive Relief to Enforce Personal Service Contracts
in the Entertainment Industries: The Need for Legislative Reform, 52 S. CAL. L. REV.
489 (1979).
11. R. DENISOFF, SOLID GOLD: THE POPULAR RECORD INDUSTRY 110 (1975).
12. Manchester v. Arista Records, Inc., No. CV 81-2134 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 1981)
(Judge Robert J. Kelleher chose not to publish the case), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION FORUM COMMITTEE ON THE ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS INDUSTRY
PRESENTS: LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE MusIc INDUSTRY 205 (1983) and reported in ENT. L.
REP., Nov. 15, 1981, at 1-2.
13. 67 Cal. App. 2d 225, 153 P.2d 983 (1944).
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value and the loss of which cannot be reasonably or adequately
compensated in damages in an action at law, may nevertheless
be enforced against the person contracting to render such serv-
ice, for a term not to exceed seven years from the commence-
ment of service under it.'4
The California statute was originally based on the Field
Code of New York15 and was enacted in California in 1872 as
section 1980 of the California Civil Code. 6 The period of serv-
ice enforceable against the employee was limited to two
years. 17 In 1919, the term was extended to five years, 8 and to
seven years in 1931.19 The statute was transferred into the La-
bor Code in 1937 as section 2855 pursuant to the Industrial La-
bor Relations Act.2 °
The effect of the statute is to render a contract unenforceable
against the employee after seven years. However, the em-
ployee may enforce a contract against the employer without re-
gard to the seven-year limitation.2' While the statute appears
fairly explicit with regard to the maximum duration of a con-
tract, legal issues arise in determining exactly what constitutes
a single contract when an agreement has been extended,
amended, or supplemented in mid-term.
14. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 1974).
15. Fields Draft, N.Y. CIV. CODE § 1013 (Weed, Parsons 1865). The Field Code was
never actually enacted into law in New York, and that state does not presently have a
statute similar to § 2855. See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
16. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1980 (Deering 1915).
17. Id.
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1980 (Deering 1923). A Louisiana statute limits the duration
of an employment contract to five years. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 167 (West 1952).
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1980 (Deering 1933). While the period of seven years may
have totemic significance in other contexts (see infra note 1 regarding the title of this
note), the basis for the seven-year period in § 2855 appears to have been a legislative
compromise between retaining the five-year period, as proposed in Senate Bill No. 937
on March 31, 1931, and adopting a ten-year period, as proposed in the amended version
of Senate Bill No. 937 on April 16, 1931. See Respondent's Brief at 7, De Haviland v.
Warner Bros., 67 Cal. App. 2d 225, 153 P.2d 983 (1944). The appellants in De Haviland
viewed seven years as an "arbitrary figure arrived at without any definite relation to
history, morals or economics." Appellant's Brief at 20, De Haviland. Section 2855 does
have a corollary, however, in early English law. The Statute of Apprentices, 5 Eliz. 1,
ch.4, provided for a seven-year apprenticeship at no wages, with the assurance that at
the end of the seventh year, the apprentice could freely ply his trade.
20. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2855 (Deering 1972).
21. Stone v. Bancroft, 139 Cal. 78, 70 P. 1017 (1903). Stone was decided under § 1980
of the Civil Code, the precursor to § 2855, which established a two-year limitation. The
decision stated that the "language is clear and explicit that [the contract] cannot be
enforced against the employee beyond the two years, and it was manifestly for his
protection that the statute was enacted. It leaves him at liberty to proceed under the
contract, if he so elects." Id. at 81-82 (emphasis in original).
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III
Personal Service Employment Contracts
A. Personal Service Employment Contracts in the Entertainment
Industry
Section 2855 applies to personal service employment con-
tracts, 22 a category which includes nearly all master/servant
continuous employment agreements.23 Included in this classifi-
cation are the employment agreements of artists. While artists
are not ordinarily classified as servants,24 they will be so de-
fined as long as the promised performance is of a personal and
non-delegable character.25
Recording agreements usually state that the artist is em-
ployed to render his personal services. 26 Duties are nondelega-
ble if pertaining to a contract based on artistic skill or unique
abilities; 27 most personal service contracts in the entertain-
ment industry contain a provision specifically stating that the
artist's services are of a special, unique, unusual, extraordi-
nary, and intellectual-and thus nondelegable--character.28
The employer includes such provisions in the contract in order
to satisfy the condition precedent to obtaining injunctive relief:
that the services be unique and extraordinary.29 The inclusion
22. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 1974).
23. See 5A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1204, at 398 (1964). The issue of
whether a contractual relationship is one of employment, and therefore within the am-
bit of the Labor Code, or an independent contractor/principal relationship outside the
purview of the Labor Code, has been litigated. See Foxx v. Williams, 244 Cal. App. 2d
223, 52 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1966); Ketcham v. Hall Syndicate, Inc. 37 Misc. 2d 693, 236
N.Y.S.2d 206 (1962), affd, 19 A.D.2d 611, 242 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1963). The issue was also
raised by Arista in Manchester but was not addressed by the court. Defendant's Mem-
orandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 12-
15, Manchester, No. CV 81-2134.
24. 5A A. CORBIN, supra note 23, at 398.
25. Id. at 399-400.
26. S. SHEMEL & M. KRAS1LOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 1 (rev. ed. 1977). Re-
lated to delegation of personal services is the issue of the assignability of the right to
future recording services; assignment might not be upheld due to the personal nature
of the services. However, most recording contracts convey (to the record company)
express authority to assign. Id. at 12. See also CALAMARI & PERMLO, supra note 2, § 18-
8, at 640 (assignment that would materially change the duty of the other party would
not be recognized).
27. See CALAMRuI & PERLO, supra note 2, § 18-25, at 663.
28. See Berman & Rosenthal, Enforcement of Personal Service Contracts in the En-
tertainment Industry: Part 1: Special Enforcement, 7 BEV. Huis B.J., Sept.-Oct. 1973,
at 49, 53.
29. Section 526 of the California Civil Procedure Code disallows the granting of an
injunction to prevent the breach of a contract, the performance of which would not be
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of the "unique and extraordinary" clause thus provides evi-
dence (which is given varying weight by different courts) ren-
dering the artist susceptible to injunction.3 0 However, such a
stipulation also supports characterization of the artist's prom-
ised performance as personal and nondelegable, thereby clas-
sifying the artist's employment agreement as a personal
service employment contract within the purview of section
2855 protections. 1
B. The Long-Term Contract
By allowing the enforcement of a contract for seven years,
section 2855 effectively limits only long-term employment
agreements.32 Such contracts may provide a degree of stability
to the employee; however, the length of the term may also
prove to be a detriment to an employee whose worth and bar-
gaining power rise dramatically during the term.3 The volatile
nature of the entertainment industry often catapults an un-
known to stardom; but the new star is often encumbered by a
contract bargained for with a low level of negotiating strength.
Conversely, the ephemeral nature of success in an industry
based on the vicissitudes of public taste makes it imperative to
maximize the earning power of a potentially short-lived but
high level of success. Nevertheless, the economic realities 4
and accepted practices of the entertainment industry result in
contracts where the artist is often tied to the employer com-
specifically enforced unless (among other requirements) the promised service is of a
"unique, unusual, extraordinary or intellectual character which gives it peculiar value
the loss of which cannot be reasonably or adequately compensated in damages in an
action at law." CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 526 (West 1954).
30. See Berman & Rosenthal, supra note 28, at 53-54. Berman and Rosenthal note
that counsel rarely challenges the characterization of the services as so unique and
extraordinary that injunctive relief is necessary, thus overlooking a potentially effec-
tive argument at a temporary restraining order conference or a hearing for a prelimi-
nary injunction. The grant of a preliminary injunction or restraining order is often the
final legal act in entertainment contract disputes.
31. See supra note 23.
32. Seven years would be considered a long term for an employment contract. A
short-term agreement (e.g., a one-year contract) may be affected if it is tacked onto a
long-term contract or is one of a series of short-term contracts. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 93 and 164.
33. Suzanne Sommers and John Schneider and Tom Wopat (the leads of the
"Dukes of Hazzard") are examples of "unknown faces" who suddenly became stars on
successful television shows and then demanded salary renegotiations. San Francisco
Sunday Examiner & Chron., Mar. 13, 1983, Datebook, at 44, col. 1.
34. See infra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
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pany for a lengthy period.35 Two characteristics of these con-
tractual arrangements are multiple option periods and
suspension/extension clauses.
1. Multiple Option Periods
Recording agreements are generally term contracts consist-
ing of a short initial term with short options. The standard re-
cording artist contract is for an initial term of one year, with
the company granted the right to exercise four successive one-
year options to extend the initial term. 6 Similarly, television
producers require actors to contract for a one-year term with
six consecutive one-year options.37 Motion picture contracts,
by contrast, are more often performed under a free-lance (pic-
ture-by-picture) arrangement, rather than on a term basis.3 8
Recording and television contracts are written in options,
rather than for a flat term, in order to allow the employer an
advantageous degree of flexibility in determining the duration
of the employment relationship. The employer may exercise
the yearly option if the employee's services are, or show a pros-
pect of becoming, profitable; at the same time the employer is
under no more than a year-to-year obligation should the em-
ployee's present or future prospects for success grow dim. 9
Aside from the benefits achievable by the party with the supe-
rior bargaining strength, the record and television production
companies have a specific economic inducement that leads
them to insist on this arrangement: thi' amount of time neces-
sary to realize a return on investment through record sales and
television syndication.4°
(a) Recording Artist Contracts
A record company's financial status depends on its long-term
35. See infra text accompanying notes 36-52 and 62-69.
36. SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 26, at 5; Cooper, Recording Contract Nego-
tiation: A Perspective, 1 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 43, 44 (1981).
37. See Sobel, Legal Briefs, THE HOLLYWOOD REP., Aug. 28, 1981, at 15.
38. During the halcyon years of the studio era (the 1920's and 1930's), actors were
usually employed on a term basis (one-year initial term with six one-year options).
With the demise of the studio system in the late 1930's and 1940's, the free-lance, or
one-picture concept, became the prevalent form of employment agreement in the mo-
tion picture industry. See 2 PRAcISNG L. INST., COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE EN-
TERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 375 (1979).
39. See Sobel, supra note 37, at 15.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 42-43 and 45-52.
No. 3]
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contracts with successful artists.41 Most recording artists do
not achieve commercial success until they have recorded three
or four albums,42 at which point the company may have nearly
$1 million invested in the artist.43 Accordingly, a short-term
contract would not provide the number of albums' to be sold
before the company would recoup its investment and turn a
41. See Ehrlich, Rock Music Mogul Sees his New Airline Take Off, San Francisco
Sunday Examiner & Chron., June 24, 1984, at D1, col. 4 (quoting Maurice Oberstein,
CBS Records Chairman (Britain)).
42. S. CHAPPLE & R. GAROFALO, ROCK AND ROLL IS HERE TO PAY 174 (1977).
43. Cooper, supra note 36, at 45. A record company's investment in an artist con-
sists of cash advances paid and expenses incurred in the production and promotion of
the results of the artist's recording efforts. Cash advances must be repaid by the artist
out of his record sales royalties and are analogous to an interest-free loan repayable
only from earnings. Id. at 47.
The recording production budget for an album by a new artist will range from $75,000
to $150,000. See Landro, Merger of Warner Unit, Polygram Angers Troubled Record In-
dustry, Wall St. J., Apr. 12, 1984, at 35, col. 4; Green & Sutherland, New Acts Labels
Play It Tight, BILLBOARD, Oct. 8, 1983, at 7, 70; Cooper, supra note 36, at 43, 45; Wallace,
Warner Bros. May Issue Fewer Albums, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 8,1979, at 10. Promotion
costs, including broadcast and print media advertising, and in-store and disc jockey
promotion, may run from $100,000 to $150,000 per album. Cooper, supra note 36, at 45.
Other post-studio production expenses are manufacturing costs, freight charges, and
administrative overhead. Production and promotion of a single new album will require
a significant investment; for example, in 1978 these costs generally ranged from
$350,000 up to $500,000, and by 1981 would sometimes escalate to over $1,000,000. 1 T.
SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, ENTERTAINMENT LAw: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND BUSINESS PRACTICES
2-7 (1983); Wallace, supra, at 10.
The recording production costs under the standard contract are recoupable ad-
vances to be paid back by the artist out of record sale royalties or other sums due to
the artist; contracts commonly include a "cross-collateralization" clause which pro-
vides that these other sums may come from "this or another contract." See infra note
95. Post-production expenses may also be deducted from the artist's royalties under
the contract, although they are sometimes improperly included in the deductions for
recording costs. See DENISOFF, supra note 11, at 68-69; SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra
note 26, at 1-2, 333; Cooper, supra note 36, at 48. While most or all of the expenditures
are chargeable to the artist, enough albums must be sold to generate the royalties to
recoup advances and cover the company's expenditures which are not recoupable
from the artist's royalties.
Estimates of the break-even point on record album sales range from 104,500 copies in
1979, to 200,000 copies in 1980 and 1981, to 250,000 copies by mid-1982. SELZ & SIMENSKY,
supra, at 2-33. However, approximately 70-90% of albums released fail to reach the
sales level necessary to cover costs. Id. at 2-32; CHAPPLE & GAROFALO, supra note 42, at
174; Landro, supra, at 35; Gortikov, Fairness in Pay-For-Play, BILLBOARD, July 28, 1979,
at 10. While record industry accounting practices entail creative definitions of "profit"
and "breaking even," apparently the majority of record album releases are not finan-
cially profitable for the record company. See G. STOKES, STAR-MAKING MACHINERY:
THE ODYSSEY OF AN ALBUM, 22-26 (1975); DENISOFF, supra note 11, at 263; CHAPPLE &
GAROFALO, supra note 42, at 174; SELZ & SIMENSKY, supra, at 2-33.
44. The typical recording contract contains a minimum and maximum guaranteed
release of two albums per either a 12- or 18-month period. Cooper, supra note 36, at 46-
47. See infra text accompanying notes 62-70 regarding suspension/extension clauses.
[Vol. 6
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profit. Conversely, a flat long-term contract might require
"throwing good money after bad" into the career of an artist
who does not appear destined for commercial sales success.
As a result, companies insist upon the initial-term-plus-yearly-
options contractual format which allows latitude for appropri-
ate business decisions as the employee's career does or does
not progress.
(b) Television Performer Contracts
As with recording contracts, the multiple option periods
found in television performer contracts are a result of the party
with the superior bargaining strength4" demanding the most
flexible contractual arrangements. Like record companies, tel-
evision producers also have a compelling economic reason for
insisting on multiple option periods: syndication.
Television producers license the first-run rights on a televi-
sion series to one of the major networks for five to seven years
at a negotiated per episode fee.' The producers do not receive
enough money from the license fees to break even on produc-
tion costs47 and must depend upon syndication sales to individ-
ual television stations in order to recoup their investment and
make a profit.' Profitable syndication requires three to five
television seasons worth of episodes;4 9 until that point, the se-
ries is deficit-financed with no guarantee of breaking even. The
usual television series rarely runs enough seasons for syndica-
tion.50 Therefore, if a series is successful, the producer must be
able to contractually obligate the actors for the number of sea-
sons necessary for syndication. The resulting standard em-
ployment agreement between the television producer and
actor is for one year with six consecutive one-year options ex-
ercisable by the producer.5 " If the television series is unsuc-
The number of required albums can result in contract suspensions and extensions
which may bring § 2855 into play.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 55-57.
46. See Thompson, The Prime Time Crime, 1 CENTURY Crry B.A. ENT. L.J. 1, 2
(1982).
47. See Sobel, supra note 37, at 15; Thompson, supra note 46, at 2.
48. Sobel, supra note 37, at 15.
49. See Thompson, supra note 46, at 5 (producer bears risk until approximately the
third season); Sobel, supra note 37, at 15 (four or five seasons worth of episodes neces-
sary for any significant syndication revenues).
50. Sobel, supra note 37, at 15.
51. Id. Professor Sobel makes an interesting point that the "producers have turned
the law [§ 28551 on its head by converting the seven-year 'shield' into a sword, or at
No. 3]
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cessful or the actor's character is written out of the series, the
producer may terminate the employment agreement by not ex-
ercising the option. On the other hand, should the show turn
out to be a success, the producer may keep the star or cast
under contract long enough to insure profitable syndication
revenues.
52
(c) Renegotiation and Amendments
As a result of the option contract, long-term employment re-
lationships may be created when the employer's risks would
otherwise be too great to allow a commitment of such duration.
When the employer does exercise his options, either because
the artist is already a star or because the employer believes the
artist will soon become one, the result is a long-term agree-
ment encompassing a contractual period during which the at-
tendant conditions have changed, often dramatically, since the
signing. While the employer may have a property much more
valuable than the price he is contractually obligated to pay,
this potential windfall is tempered by the common entertain-
ment industry practice of mid-term renegotiations. 3 While the
"sanctity of contracts" is affected by such renegotiations, they
are often necessary to keep the artist happy by raising his level
of compensation to more accurately reflect his worth. Such re-
negotiations also serve to appease the artist who has
threatened to walk away from his contract.54
Renegotiations are inevitable under the option contract sys-
tem in the television and recording industries. A television ac-
tor signs a seven-year contract at a determined yearly salary
without a guarantee that he will even be tested for a part for
least a burr." Id. Professor Sobel appears to be implying that since § 2855 establishes
the maximum duration for enforcement of a personal service contract, the industry
has co-opted the seven years as the industry standard for contract duration.
52. The Federal Communications Commission has proposed dramatic changes in
the television syndication rules. See Amendment of Syndication and Financial Inter-
est Rules, Tentative Decision and Request for Further Comments in BC Docket 82-345,
FCC 83-377, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,020 (adopted Aug. 4, 1983).
53. See Bushkin & Meyer, The Enforceability of Mid-Term Extensions of Employ-
ment Agreements Under California Labor Code § 2855, 15 BEV. HiLLS B.J. 385, 385, 396
(1981). Note, supra note 10, at 496 n.36.
Contract renegotiations do occur in other areas of business where the contracts are
long-term and susceptible to changing conditions. One example is commercial real
estate leases. See Sobel, supra note 37, at 15.
54. See Thompson, supra note 46, at 1.
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which he is already under contract.55 As a result of his supe-
rior bargaining position, the television producer will not have
to negotiate with an actor who knows that he is wanted for the
part (i.e., an actor who can negotiate at arm's length). In the
recording industry, a new artist may be able to negotiate for a
royalty of eleven percent or twelve percent of the retail price of
each album sold; an established recording artist may have the
bargaining power to get up to eighteen percent.5 6 An artist who
makes the leap from a new to an established artist, while still
under a contract entailing a low percentage royalty or low sal-
ary, will understandably want to share in the proceeds result-
ing from his increased stature. 7
The employer may be willing to acquiesce to an increased
royalty scale or other changes in contractual provisions, but
will most likely demand an extension of the employment
agreement in the form of an additional option year (or years)
as a quid pro quo .58 This type of extension might also result
from factors other than renegotiation demands. For example,
the employer may desire to secure services that he foresees as
profitable beyond the term of the original agreement and
amend the agreement or draw up a new contract.5 9 In another
scenario, an issue outside the scope of the contract may arise
whereby the company provides a compensatory benefit to the
artist and, in exchange, the contract is amended by a grant to
the company of another option on the artist's services."
Such extensions of the contract-whether by renegotiation,
amendment, or modification-implicate section 2855 if they ex-
tend the employment relationship beyond a total of seven
years from the signing of the original contract. The issue is
55. Id.
56. See Cooper, supra note 36, at 51; Green & Sutherland, supra note 43, at 70. Re-
cording superstar Michael Jackson reportedly has the highest royalty rate in the rec-
ord business-approximately 42% of the wholesale price of each record sold. Goldberg
& Connelly, Trouble in Paradise?, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 15, 1984, at 23, 25.
57. Renegotiations brought about by a recording artist's commercial success may
possibly be avoided by a provision which ties increased royalties to increased sales.
See Cooper, supra note 36, at 54. For a television contract success clause, see Thomp-
son, supra note 46, at 5 (based on Nielsen ratings and advertising revenues). However,
other contractual provisions that reflect the previous balance of bargaining power (e.g.,
advances, creative control, copyright reversions) may impel the artist to demand
renegotiation.
58. See Note, supra note 10, at 496 n.36; Injunctions-Unjust Restraint on Entertain-
ers in California, 1 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 91, 107-08 (1981).
59. See Bushkin & Meyer, supra note 53, at 386.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 95 and 171.
No. 31
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whether the renegotiated, amended, or modified contract is ac-
tually a "new" contract, thus starting the seven-year limit run-
ning afresh, or whether it is merely an extension of the old
contract and thus subject to the seven-year limitation running
from the date of the initial employment agreement.
Crucial in this analysis is the fact that the new agreement is
negotiated while the employee is bound by the original agree-
ment. The employee once again is at a negotiating disadvan-
tage; he must negotiate with an employer to whom he is
already obligated, and thus might not be able to achieve the
compensation he could have gotten on the open market. The
enforceability of the resulting agreement-where the em-
ployee is obligated to an employment relationship running
more than seven years without the benefit of an "open-market"
break6 1-will depend on the interpretation given to section
2855.
2. Suspension/Extension Clauses
Personal service contracts in the entertainment industry
often contain suspension/extension clauses which allow the
employer to suspend the employment contract and extend the
term of the agreement by the duration of the aggregate periods
of any such suspensions.62 The clause normally encompasses
61. See Bushkin & Meyer, supra note 53, at 385, 393-98.
62. See Berman & Rosenthal, supra note 28, at 57. A representative clause reads:
We [the Company] shall have the right, at our election, to suspend the run-
ning of the term of this contract and our obligations hereunder upon written
notice to you [the Artist] if for any reason whatsoever your voice or your abil-
ity to perform as an instrumentalist shall become impaired or if you shall re-
fuse, neglect, or be unable to comply with any of your obligations hereunder,
or if as a result of an act of God, accident, fire, labor controversy, riot, civil
commotion, act of public enemy, law enactment, rule, order, or act of any gov-
ernment or governmental instrumentality, failure of technical facilities, failure
or delay of transportation facilities, illness or incapacity, or other cause of a
similar or dissimilar nature not reasonably within our control or which we
could not by reasonable diligence have avoided, we are hampered in the re-
cording, manufacture, distribution or sale of phonograph records or our nor-
mal business operations become commercially impractical. Such suspension
shall be for the duration of any such event or contingency, and unless we no-
tify you to the contrary in writing, the term hereof (whether the initial term or
any renewal term hereof) during which such event or contingency shall have
commenced shall be automatically extended by such number of days as equal
the total number of days of any such suspension. During any such suspension
you shall not render your services as a recording artist to any other person,
firm or corporation.
PRACTISING L. INST., LEGAL AND BUSINESS PROBLEMS OF THE RECORD INDUSTRY 127, 141
(1978) (Elektra/Asylum Artist Term Contract).
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the contingencies6 3 of breach by the employee,64 illness or inca-
pacity of the employee,6 and acts of God or force majeure.66
Suspension/extension clauses are another manifestation of
the employer's superior bargaining power; the right to suspend
and extend the contract is purely contractual and not based on
common law67 or statutory rights.68 This right primarily inures
to the benefit of the employer by insuring receipt of the con-
tracted-for period of service at the employee's current level of
compensation.69
The mechanical extension of the contract for the period of
suspensions results in the contract being extended past the
originally contracted-for term if the "term" is measured in cal-
endar time rather than service time.70 If the extension runs
past seven years from the beginning of the employment agree-
ment, the enforceability of these contractual extensions must
be determined according to section 2855. This issue, with pro-
cedural variations, is presented in Manchester v. Arista. Dis-
cussion of the Manchester case, however, first requires an
examination of the seminal case interpreting section 2855: De
Haviland7 1 v. Warner Brothers.72
63. See Youngman, Negotiation of Personal Service Contracts, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 2,
11 (1954).
64. See, e.g., Universal Pictures v. Cummings, 150 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1945) (involving
the refusal of an actor to play a role). In recording contracts, the breach is commonly
in the form of not fulflling the contractual requirement of a certain number of albums
per year. The contract will be extended by a period equal to the artist's delay in deliv-
ering the required number of albums, i.e., the contract year is not completed until the
albums are produced. See Cooper, supra note 36, at 46; see infra text accompanying
note 93.
65. See, e.g., De Haviland v. Warner Bros., 67 Cal. App. 2d 225, 228, 153 P.2d 983, 984
(1944).
66. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Bumgarner, 197 Cal. App. 2d 331, 335, 17 Cal. Rptr. 171,
173 (1961).
67. Youngman, supra note 63, at 11.
68. Note, supra note 10, at 494-95.
69. Youngman, supra note 63, at 11-12. In the case of an artist's incapacity, the
presence of a suspension/extension clause may be to the benefit of a nonestablished
employee by giving the employer an alternative to cancellation of the contract. Id.
70. The method of measuring the term is an important aspect of the interpretation
of § 2855 in the De Haviland case. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
71. De Havilland's name was misspelled in the title of the reported case. See I
WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA 838 (41st ed. 1980-1981). In this note, the case name will be
cited as reported, while other references to De Havilland's name will be spelled
correctly.
72. 67 Cal. App. 2d 225, 153 P.2d 983 (1944).
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IV
De Haviland v. Warner Brothers: California
Public Policy
In 1936, Warner Brothers Pictures entered into a contract
with Olivia De Havilland for a term of fifty-two weeks with the
option to extend the term for six successive fifty-two week pe-
riods. Warner Brothers exercised all six options and De Havil-
land performed from 1936 to 1943, a period of seven calendar
years. The contract contained a standard suspension/exten-
sion clause giving Warner Brothers the right to suspend De
Havilland for failure, refusal or neglect to perform her services
to the full extent of her ability.73
During the seven years, Warner Brothers suspended De
Havilland for a total of twenty-five weeks as a result of her re-
fusal to play several roles7 4 (with one suspension due to ill-
ness), and extended the term of the agreement for a like
period. In 1943, De Havilland sought a judgment declaring that
the contract was unenforceable against her after seven years
under section 2855, despite the fact that the extensions were
made under an otherwise valid contractual provision.
De Havilland was granted her requested relief. The court
held that the duration of the contractual term enforceable
against the employee was seven calendar years, rather than
seven years of actual service.75 However, Warner Brothers
contended that De Havilland had effectively waived the protec-
tion of section 2855 by her breaches of the contract and was
thus estopped from disputing the validity of the contract
extensions.
The court responded to Warner Brother's argument by set-
ting forth the purpose of section 2855:
It is safe to say that the great majority of men and women who
73. See supra text accompanying notes 60-68.
74. De Havilland began to refuse roles which she felt were not "suitable to her
stature as an artist" after she appeared in "Gone With the Wind." Appellant's Opening
Brief at 4-5, De Haviland.
75. De Haviland, 67 Cal. App. 2d at 230-34, 153 P.2d at 987. Warner Brothers
presented an extensive semantic argument that the wording of the statute allowed the
enforcement of a contract for exceptional services for seven years of actual service.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 9-16, 19-25, De Haviland. The argument was based on the
purpose underlying the phrasing changes wrought in the 1931 amendment of § 1980 of
the Civil Code (the predecessor to § 2855). However, the court reasoned that the legis-
lature would have included the phrase "actual service" (or "term of service" or 'years
of service") if it had so intended. De Haviland, 67 Cal. App. 2d at 231-33, 153 P.2d at 986.
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work are engaged in rendering personal services under em-
ployment contracts. Without their labors the activities of the
entire county would stagnate. Their welfare is the direct con-
cern of every community. Seven years of time is fixed as the
maximum time for which they may contract for their services
without the right to change employers or occupations. Thereaf-
ter they may make a change if they deem it necessary or advisa-
ble. There are innumerable reasons why a change of
employment may be to their advantage. Considerations relat-
ing to age or health, to the rearing and schooling of children,
new economic conditions and social surroundings may call for
a change. As one grows more experienced and skillful there
should be a reasonable opportunity to move upward and to em-
ploy his abilities to the best advantage and for the highest ob-
tainable compensation .76
The court then declared that the statute promoted the welfare
of the general public77 and applied the well-established rule
embodied in section 3513 of the California Civil Code78 that
"rights created in the public interest may not be contravened
by private agreement.7v9 Thus, even though the extensions
were a matter of valid contractual agreement and resulted
solely from De Havilland's own actions, the advantages of sec-
tion 2855 could not be waived.
The court specifically noted that allowing the employee to
waive his rights under section 2855 would nullify any practical
effect of the statute:
[T]he construction of the code sections contended for by de-
fendant would render the law unworkable and would lead to an
absurd result. If an employee may waive the statutory right in
question by his conduct, he may waive it by agreement, but if
the power to waive it exists at all, the statute accomplishes
nothing. An agreement to work for more than seven years
would be an effective waiver of the right to quit at the end of
seven. The right given by the statute can run in favor of those
only who have contracted to work for more than seven years
and as these would have waived the right by contracting it
away, the statute could not operate at all. It could scarcely
have been the intention of the legislature to protect employees
from the consequences of their improvident contracts and still
76. De Haviland, 67 Cal. App. 2d at 235, 153 P.2d at 988 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 236, 153 P.2d at 988.
78. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3513 (West 1970) ("Any one may waive the advantage of a law
intended solely for his benefit. But a law established for a public reason cannot be
contravened by a private agreement.").
79. De Haviland, 67 Cal. App. 2d at 236, 153 P.2d at 988.
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leave them free to throw away the benefits conferred upon
them. The limitation of the life of personal service contracts
and the employee's rights thereunder could not be waived.80
The factual situation underlying the De Haviland case un-
derscores the court's reading of the statute in absolute terms,8
thereby guaranteeing the rights of the employee.2 The con-
tract had been reviewed and approved by the Los Angeles Su-
perior Court (because of De Havilland's status as a minor at
the time of signing83) as "just, fair and conscionable . "...'84
The contract set De Havilland's salary at $500 per week, with
periodic increases raising that sum to $2500 per week in the
seventh year of the contract (1943).8 The contract as written
would have been completed in less than seven years. Warner
Brothers did not have the right to arbitrarily extend the term
of the contract; the extensions could only be invoked by De
Havilland,86 which she in fact did.8 7 De Havilland had the alter-
native of honoring the contract by completing it, but chose not
to for personal reasons.8 8 As Warner Brothers stated to the
court of appeal, "[De Havilland] now claims, having had all of
the privileges and benefits of the contract, that equity should
discharge her from her contract obligation."89
The equities of the case appeared to weigh overwhelmingly
in favor of Warner Brothers; yet the court of appeal ruled for
De Havilland.90 Warner Brothers repeated these arguments in
a petition to the California Supreme Court, but was denied a
hearing.91 De Haviland, then, stands as an expression of the
80. Id. at 236-37, 153 P.2d at 988-89 (emphasis added).
81. See infra text accompanying notes 152-61.
82. For a full "behind-the-scenes" treatment of De Haviland see Bushkin & Meyer,
supra note 53, at 389.
83. A minor employed to render artistic or creative services may not disaffirm an
otherwise valid contract on the ground that it was entered into during minority if the
contract has been reviewed and approved by a county superior court. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 36 (West 1982).
84. Bushkin & Meyer, supra note 53, at 389.
85. Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, De Haviland.
86. Appellant's Closing Brief at 38, De Haviland.
87. See id. at 24-25; Bushkin & Meyer, supra note 53, at 389.
88. See Appelant's Closing Brief at 16, De Hailand.
89. Id.
90. De Haviland, 67 Cal. App. 2d at 235, 153 P.2d at 988-89.
91. Warner Brothers' Petition for Hearing, Ev. No. 14643, De Haviland (Cal. Sup.
Ct. filed Jan. 16, 1945). The effect of a denial of hearing by the California Supreme
Court has been regarded by some judges and attorneys as establishing weightier pre-
cedent for the particular court of appeal decision than when no hearing has been
sought. See generally 6 B. Wrr=, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE 4581 (1970 & Supp. 1983).
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formidable weight of public policy backing the seven-year rule.
Nearly forty years later, the federal district court in
Manchester was also called upon to interpret section 2855.
V
Manchester v. Arista Records, Inc.92
A. Factual Background
In 1973, Melissa Manchester, a popular recording artist,
signed a contract with Arista Records, Inc. The contract called
for an initial term of eighteen months with four one-year op-
tions exercisable by Arista. Manchester was required to de-
liver two record albums during the initial eighteen month
period and two albums during each additional contract year.93
The contract contained a standard suspension/extension
clause giving Arista the right to suspend the contract in the
event of a default or breach by Manchester in the performance
of her contractual obligations, i.e., if she were late in producing
the required albums, the contract would not be completed un-
til the albums were produced. Manchester was late on several
However, there is a substantial body of authority limiting the precedential effect of a
denial. See id. at 4583-84; see also People v. Davis, 147 Cal. 346, 81-82 P. 718 (1905).
While the effect of a denial of a petition for hearing does not appear to be settled, see
Note, Forward: Ripe for Decision, Internal and Current Concerns of the California
Supreme Court, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 309, 313-14 n.1l (1974), the California Supreme Court
has stated:
Although this court's denial of a hearing is not to be regarded as expressing
approval of the propositions of law set forth in an opinion of the District Court
of Appeal or as having the same authoritative effect as an earlier decision of
this court ... it does not follow that such denial is without significance as to
our views.
Id. (quoting DiGenova v. State Bd. of Educ., 57 Cal. 2d 167, 178, 18 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375
(1962)).
92. No. CV 81-2134 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 1981).
93. Record companies normally require two albums per year, so that the company
can maintain the artist's image in the public eye and effectively recoup its investment.
This requirement may result in the output of weaker musical material. Critics of the
record industry have characterized this situation as an aspect of the "commoditiza-
tion" of the recording artist by the company. CHAPPLE & GAROFALO, supra note 42, at
30. This process, however, would appear to be somewhat inevitable whenever art (cre-
ating an expression) mixes with business (selling that creative expression as a prod-
uct). Nevertheless, the recording artist's career absolutely depends upon having his
product recorded, released, and made available to the public. Accordingly, the artist
will often negotiate for a minimum and maximum guaranteed release to insure the
commitment of the record company, while attempting to avoid the exercise of a sus-
pension/extension clause due to lateness. See Cooper, supra note 36, at 46-47. See
also J. TAUBMAN, IN TUNE WrrH THE Music BUSINESS 55-56 (1980).
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occasions and Arista exercised its suspension rights so that
eight years after the beginning of the employment relationship
the parties were only in the fifth and final year of the contract.
In 1976, Manchester and Arista signed an agreement
whereby Arista would pay Manchester's former producer the
amount of a judgment he had obtained against her, 4 in ex-
change for a one-year option, exercisable at the completion of
the 1973 contract.9 In 1980, Arista notified Manchester that it
would exercise the one-year option under the 1976 agreement.
In 1981, Manchester filed an action for declaratory judg-
ment,96 seeking to have her contract with Arista declared unen-
forceable under section 2855. Manchester alleged that her
contract was entered into in 1973 and amended in 1976, and
contended that both agreements were unenforceable seven
years after the first agreement was entered into.
Arista claimed that Manchester owed Arista one album
under the 1973 contract and two albums under the 1976 con-
tract. Arista moved to dismiss the action on the basis of a fo-
rum selection clause in the 1973 contract. The court granted
Arista's motion as to the 1973 contract, but refused to do so for
the 1976 contract. In holding that the 1976 contract was in-
94. The former producer brought a lawsuit against Manchester in state court in
New York and obtained a judgment in his favor of $145,000. Defendant's Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 5, Manchester.
95. Under the agreement, the payment was an advance to be charged against
Manchester's royalty account and recouped from royalties due under the 1973 agree-
ment and the 1976 agreement. Recording contracts commonly include a "cross-col-
lateralization" clause which provides that recoupable advances (owed by the artist to
the company) may be debited from "this or another contract." This type of provision
allows the company to "cross-collateralize" the production costs or other monies ad-
vanced to the artist. This accounting practice applies royalties received under one
agreement to the artist's royalty account debt under another contract.
The effects of cross-collateralization are particularly onerous for an artist whose
publishing contract is with an affiliate of the record company. The artist as composer
is a different business persona from the artist as recording artist. Under a songwriting-
publishing agreement, the artist normally receives royalties beginning with the sale of
the first record because there are essentially no recoupable expenses or advances in-
volved. However, a cross-collateralization provision will allow the company to apply
the publishing (or mechanical copyright) royalties against the recording production
costs and advances. The artist will not actually receive any royalties until the record-
ing costs and advances are recouped out of the artist's earnings from record sales and
publishing royalties.
A recording artist must have a strong bargaining position in order to exclude a cross-
collateralization provision from the contract. See TAUBMAN, supra note 93, at 58-59;
Cooper, supra note 36, at 57.
96. The suit was filed under diversity jurisdiction in the United States District
Court, Central District of California.
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dependent of the 1973 contract, the court analyzed the depen-
dency question under section 2855.
B. Manchester's Argument
Manchester argued that the 1976 contract was not enforcea-
ble against her because she had entered into that agreement
while still obligated to Arista under the 1973 contract. Because
there was no break in the continuum of the employment rela-
tionship during which Manchester could freely contract with
an employer other than Arista, she asserted that under section
2855 this continuous contract could not be enforced against her
seven years after the beginning of the 1973 agreement. Since
the 1973 agreement had already been extended more than
seven years, and the 1976 option was exercisable only upon
completion of the 1973 contract, Manchester contended that
the 1976 agreement was therefore unenforceable against her.
The success of Manchester's argument depended on the
court's acceptance of the De Haviland court's interpretation of
section 2855, which stressed the employee's absolute right 98 to
freely bargain for the highest obtainable compensation after
being under contract for seven years. The argument for such
an interpretation is as follows: an agreement extending a con-
tract, negotiated while the earlier contract is in force and tak-
ing effect upon expiration of the earlier contract, does not
constitute a new contract starting the seven-year period run-
ning again. The reason for this is that the employee has not
had the open-market break guaranteed after seven years when
she would be free to contract her services to another employer.
The new agreement, rather than a new and independent con-
tract, should be characterized as a mid-term extension of the
original contract. Such an extension would constitute a waiver
of the protections of section 2855 and must therefore be invalid.
This is essentially the argument implied, if not explicitly
stated, by Manchester.99
C. The Court's Treatment of the Contracts
Before discussing the court's response to Manchester's char-
97. Plaintiffs Points and Authorities in Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Motion
for Judgment at 23-24, Manchester.
98. See supra text accompanying note 81; see also infra text accompanying notes
152-61.
99. Plaintiff's Reply at 22-25, Manchester.
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acterization of the 1976 contract as a mid-term extension, the
court's treatment of the 1973 contract merits analysis.
1. The 1973 Contract: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum
While the ruling regarding Manchester's 1973 contract was
not based on section 2855, it nevertheless involved interesting
section 2855 issues concerning the procedural question of
choice of law and forum.
The 1973 contract contained choice of law and choice of fo-
rum clauses specifying that New York law would govern and
that jurisdiction would be granted to the Supreme Court of the
State of New York. Choice of forum clauses are enforced by
the federal,100 California,' and New York'0 2 courts if they are
freely entered into, negotiated at arm's length, and unaffected
by fraud and if there is an absence of excessive influence by
one party. 0 3  Manchester argued that the choice of forum
clause was unenforceable, not because of these factors, but
rather because it would violate the public policy of California.
The thrust of her argument was that a New York court would
not hesitate to apply its own law as specified in the contract;
New York has no statutory equivalent to California's section
2855 limiting the enforceable duration of a contract, 10 4 thereby
leaving Manchester bound to a contract that had already run
for eight years.0 5 Under California law, this contract would
have violated the strong public policy expressed in section
2855.106 Additionally, California courts generally enforce
100. See Bremen v. The Zapata Off-Shore Oil Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
101. See Smith, Balentino and Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 491, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 374 (1976).
102. See Export Ins. Co. v. Mitsui Steamship Co., 26 A.D.2d 436, 274 N.Y.S.2d 977
(1966).
103. See supra notes 100 and 102; see infra text accompanying notes 152-61.
104. SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 26, at 5. New York does, however, limit the
duration of a minor's contract to three years. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-105(2) (d) (Mc-
Kinney 1978). See, e.g., Prinze v. Jonas, 48 A.D.2d 315, 369 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1975). New
York's statute indicates a public policy concern that the duration of a contract be rea-
sonable and is perhaps a precursor to legislative action concerning adult contracts.
See SHEMEL & KRiASLVOSKY, supra note 26, at 5.
105. See Ketcham v. Hall Syndicate, Inc., 37 Misc. 2d 693, 236 N.YS.2d 206 (1962),
affid, 19 A.D.2d 611, 242 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1963) (enforcing a ten-year contract under New
York law). The Ketcham court, while finding that Ketcham (creator of "Dennis the
Menace") was actually an independent contractor and therefore unable to invoke the
protection of California Labor Code § 2855, see supra note 23, based its decision on a
determination that the contract did not require perpetual performance.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
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choice of law clauses in contracts;10 however, they will not en-
force a choice of law clause requiring the application of a for-
eign jurisdiction's law that would offend California's public
policy. 0 8
The district court judge in Manchester found that section
2855 expressed a strong public policy of California, °9 as con-
strued in De Haviland;"0 a California court would apply Cali-
fornia law and not enforce a clause requiring application of a
New York law which would "directly contravene the strong
public policy of California embodied in § 2855."' As a result of
this determination, the issue arising from Arista's motion to
dismiss the action was "whether a choice of forum clause, al-
though enforceable on its face as being reasonable and agreed
to in an arm's length transaction, should nevertheless be re-
fused enforcement because the chosen forum would apply a
rule of law contrary to a strong public policy of the forum in
which the action was brought.""12 Stating that this question ap-
peared to be a matter of first impression, the court granted
Arista's motion to dismiss, holding the forum selection clause
enforceable under several theories." 3
On a pragmatic level, the court noted that if Manchester's
argument were a correct interpretation of the law, a court
would have to determine the result of the litigation in the
transferee court whenever a choice of forum clause was pres-
ent in a disputed contract and would then have to determine
whether that result would contravene a strong public policy of
the transferor court's state."4 This type of analysis would be
"complicated and uncertain in cases involving complex legal
questions or voluminous amounts of disputed issues of fact
[.. land would involve] detailed speculation on the merits at
the outset of the action.""15
107. Windsor Mills Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 987, 101 Cal. Rptr.
347 (1972).
108. Hollingworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1980);
Weisz v. Weisz, 19 Cal. App. 3d 676, 97 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1971).
109. Manchester, No. CV 81-2134 at 11. See also supra text accompanying notes 76-
80.
110. De Haviland, 67 Cal. App. 2d at 235-36, 153 P.2d at 988.
111. Manchester, No. CV 81-2134 at 11. See also supra text accompanying notes 76-
80.
112. Manchester, No. CV 81-2134 at 11.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 11-12.
115. Id. at 12.
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On a theoretical level, the court distinguished a refusal to en-
force a choice of law clause from enforcement of a choice of
forum clause: the latter "merely allows the courts of the cho-
sen forum to enforce their laws; it does not force the transferor
court to act on the merits at all.""1 6
A third reason for enforcing the choice of forum clause was
to preserve the certainty of the contract as intended by the par-
ties, and thus avoid a race to the courthouse of a jurisdiction
where a party could claim that the result of enforcing the
choice of forum clause would be contrary to that jurisdiction's
public policy." 7
Arista's motion to dismiss the complaint for noncompliance
with the choice of forum clause in the 1973 contract was ulti-
mately granted." 8
The outcome-determinative nature of the choice of law and
choice of forum issues illustrates the important differences be-
tween California and New York law regarding the duration of
personal service employment agreements. Most recording
contracts are signed in either New York or California." 9 The
parties (artists and companies) are often residents of, or have
their principal place of business in, either New York or Califor-
nia. 2 ° Accordingly, either California or New York law will
probably be controlling where the parties do not specify the
law of either state.12 '




119. SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 26, at 5.
120. For example, Melissa Manchester signed the 1973 contract in New York while a
resident of New York. She began recording albums in California in 1974, moved to
California in 1975, and brought the 1981 action as a resident of California. Arista has its
principal place of business in New York; the 1976 Arista/Manchester contract was
signed in New York. Manchester, No. CV 81-2134 at 3-4.
121. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAws § 188 (1971) states:
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract
are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue,
has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under
the principles stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187)
the contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to deter-
mine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
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ifornia law is important; an enforceable contract under New
York law may be rendered unenforceable in California by sec-
tion 2855. Considerations of certainty regarding the effect of
the written agreement mandate the inclusion of both a choice
of forum and choice of law provision.122 Examination of the
1976 Manchester/Arista contract demonstrates that a choice of
law clause alone may not be applied in certain circumstances.
2. The 1976 Contract-Mid-term Extension?
The court considered the 1976 contract 123 separately because,
while it specified New York law, the contract did not include a
choice of forum clause. 124 In the court's view, Manchester's ar-
gument-that the 1976 contract was, under section 2855, simply
an agreement continuing or extending the 1973 contract and
thus unenforceable against her seven years after the signing of
the first agreement-was doomed from the start. If the 1976
agreement was not an independent contract but rather an ex-
tension of the 1973 contract, the choice of forum clause in the
1973 contract would have applied, and the entire action should
have been dismissed. 25 On the other hand, the court ruled
that if the 1976 contract was an independent contract, Califor-
nia law would apply 26 since no choice of forum clause was
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance
are in the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied, except
as otherwise provided in §§ 189-199 and 203.
122. An additional choice of law/conflicts of law problem could foreseeably arise
should a court apply the doctrine of renvoi. When a jural matter is referred to a for-
eign law for decision, a renvoi question is raised: "[I]s the reference to the corre-
sponding rule of the conflict of laws of that foreign law, or is the reference to the purely
internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law, minus
its conflict-of-laws rules?" Schreiber, The Doctrine of the Renvoi in Anglo-American
Law, 31 HARv. L. REv. 523, 525 (1917). The answer will depend on the court's approach
to choice-of-law.
The renvoi issue may be avoided by the insertion of a clause specifying the choice of
forum and the choice of law "regardless of its or any other law's choice of law princi-
ples." Interview with Neil Flanzwraich, Esq., Syntex Corp. in Palo Alto, Cal. (Nov. 15,
1982).
123. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
124. Manchester, No. CV 81-2134 at 13; see Manchester/Arista Contract, id. at 24,
para. 29.
125. Id. at 13-14.
126. The ruling that California, rather than New York, law would apply was based
on "California's strong public policy." Id. (referring to § 2855). However, enforcement
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present; Manchester, however, would still not prevail, because
the 1976 contract had only run for one year and thus did not yet
violate the seven-year rule. 27
While the court reasoned that Manchester would not prevail
whether the contract was characterized as dependent or in-
dependent, it determined that the issue of what law applied to
the contracts still merited discussion. If the 1976 contract had
been found dependent on the 1973 contract, and California law
had been held inapplicable, the action would have been dis-
missed without prejudice for failure to bring the claim in the
proper forum, due to the choice of forum clause in the 1973 con-
tract. The court, however, held that the contract was independ-
of a one-year contract would not violate California public policy, and therefore enforc-
ing the New York choice of law clause would also presumably not violate California
public policy. In view of the choice of law clause specifying New York law, the court
(upon finding the contract independent) possibly should have applied New York law,
rather than analyzing the contract under California law and § 2855; yet the analysis
under § 2855 was necessary to determine whether the contract was dependent on or
independent of the 1973 contract in the first place, resulting in a "which came first, the
chicken or the egg" type of analytical problem. In this fact situation, an appropriate
analysis might have been first to apply California law and § 2855, and then after finding
the contract independent, to apply the specified New York law, which would entail no
public policy violation.
127. This portion of the Manchester case was cited in the moving papers of Arista
Records in a lawsuit filed by singer Jennifer Warnes. See Motion of Defendant Arista
Records, Inc. to Dismiss the Complaint, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support Thereof at 6, Warnes v. Arista Records Inc., No. 81-4628 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30,
1981).
Warnes sought a declaratory judgment as to whether her contract with Arista, which
was entered into on March 11, 1975, would be unenforceable under § 2855 as of March
11, 1982. Warnes, a California citizen, argued that the contract was unenforceable
under § 2855 even though the contract specified New York law. Plaintiff's Memoran-
dum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Com-
plaint at 5, Warnes.
In Warnes, Arista cited the above portion of the Manchester case as support for its
argument that the issue of enforceability under § 2855 was not yet a "ripe" controversy,
because the contract had not yet run seven years. Reply Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion of Defendant Arista Records, Inc. to Dismiss the
Complaint at 7, Warnes. Therefore, Arista argued, Warnes could not aver a justiciable
controversy. Id. at 2.
Warnes argued that Manchester was distinguishable because in Manchester two
years had yet to run before § 2855 might bar enforcement of the 1976 agreement, while
the seven years would have run on Warnes's agreement within less than four months
from the date of the hearing on her motion. Plaintiff's Opposition at 13, Warnes.
Arista countered that there was no authority for the proposition that where there is a
date-certain before which a controversy can possibly be ripe, the degree of prematurity
has any bearing. Defendant's Reply at 7, Warnes.
The United States District Court granted Arista's motion to dismiss Warnes's com-
plaint. (Issues of law in addition to the above issues were present in the lawsuit.)
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ent of the 1973 contract; 12 it analyzed the dependency question
under California law and section 2855, and dismissed the claim
on the merits for "failure to state a claim for violation of § 2855
for which the court may grant relief."'129
3. The Balancing Approach: Arguments Pro and Con
(a) The Manchester Court's Balancing Approach
The Manchester court rejected the plaintiff's argument that
the 1976 contract was an extension of the 1973 contract in viola-
tion of section 2855, finding the plaintiff's analysis overly
broad.130 The court reasoned that such an approach "would ef-
fectively prevent an employee from entering into a new con-
tract with his or her current employer until after the
completion of all obligations between them."'' The court pro-
posed a case-by-case balancing test, with an emphasis upon
the point in time when the second agreement was entered into:
The better course is to consider the circumstances surrounding
the formation of the new contract in each situation. If the new
contract was entered into at or near the time of formation of
the earlier contract, and if the two contracts appear to have
been entered into to avoid the application of § 2855 to a single
agreement, then they should be considered a single contract
for purposes of § 2855. However, if the latter contract was en-
tered into toward the end of the first contract, it should be
treated as a separate agreement for purposes of § 2855. Each
employment situation will necessarily be interpreted accord-
ing to its unique facts. The interpretation of the two contracts
should be made in light of the policy consideration underlying
§ 2855 to protect employees, rather than by principles of formal
contract law'
32
The court considered a number of factors in applying this
test. The 1976 contract was entered into following the partial
completion of the 1973 contract and was an integrated agree-
ment embodying several material differences from the 1973
contract: the 1976 contract did not contain a forum selection
clause; the royalty provisions were materially altered; and
since the contract was entered into to pay the debt owed by
Manchester to her former producer, it was thereby supported
128. Manchester, No. CV 81-2134 at 13-14.
129. Id. at 15.
130. Id. at 13.




by a different consideration. 133 The court found that the only
significant factor supporting the dependency of the contracts
was that the 1976 agreement was an option contract exercisa-
ble only if all of the options under the 1973 contract were exer-
cised by Arista.
This type of "balancing approach" has been acknowledged
by some commentators as a viable method of interpreting mid-
term extensions under section 2855.134 Again, the sparse case
law does not provide a clear-cut answer to the question of
whether a mid-term agreement may start another seven-year
period. However, De Haviland provides support, not only for
the inability of a valid suspension/extension clause to extend
the seven years, but also for the incapacity of the employee to
separately agree (as Manchester did) to a provision which ex-
tends the contract past seven years, even near the end of the
contracted-for term.
(b) De Haviland Revisited
Nearly six years after commencing services under her con-
tract, De Havilland had requested and received a four-week ex-
tension of her contract so that she could take a four-week leave
of absence.'35 At trial Warner Brothers raised this amendment
to the agreement as a defense to De Havilland's claim that the
contract was no longer enforceable against her and again ar-
gued the point to the court of appeal.
Nevertheless, even this express agreement was not allowed
to extend the seven years. The court of appeal gave the statute
the absolute reading noted by Warner Brothers to be the only
interpretation under which De Havilland could be relieved
from her contract: "Only a holding that L.C. 2855 is mandatory,
absolute, and represents an expression of public policy and
was established for a public reason, can in this case justify the
granting of any relief herein to the artist."'36 The court of ap-
peal made only brief reference in its opinion to De Havilland's
express agreement.' 37 While this issue was argued strenu-
133. Id. at 14-15.
134. See infra text accompanying note 164.
135. Appellant's Closing Brief at 25-26, Warner Brothers' Petition for Hearing at 20,
De Haviland.
136. Appellant's Opening Brief at 35, De Haviland.
137. De Haviland, 67 Cal. App. 2d at 228, 153 P.2d at 984.
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ously by Warner Brothers, it was apparently viewed as insuffi-
cient to support an extension of the contract.
In its Petition for Hearing before the California Supreme
Court,138 Warner Brothers argued that the common film indus-
try practice of amendatory or supplemental agreements which
extend the contractual term was destroyed by the De Haviland
decision. Warner Brothers asserted that the decision not only
restricted contracts like the one involved in De Haviland, but
also prohibited any other independent services contracts be-
tween the parties entered into during the seven-year period,
even if the contract would take effect after that time.
139
Warner Brothers made the policy argument that a producer
expends great sums of money in order to build up a star, but
will often not be able to obtain the benefits of his "asset" until
near the end of the original contract period. The producer pro-
tects his investment by entering into a new contract for the art-
ist's services (with new terms and considerations) before the
current contract has expired."4 These new contracts, Warner
Brothers argued, would apparently be held completely unen-
forceable under the court of appeal's decision in De
Haviland 141
The Manchester court's concern that an absolute interpreta-
tion of section 2855 would "effectively prevent an employee
from entering into a new contract with his or her current em-
ployer until after the completion of all obligations between
them,"'42 provides a degree of vindication for the argument as-
serted by Warner Brothers in its Petition for Hearing in the De
Haviland case. While the Manchester court did not mention
industry practice, artists' agreements in the recording industry
frequently consist of more than a single document, with
amendments and modifications added when an option is exer-
cised or the agreement extended. 143 As Warner Brothers ar-
gued in the context of the film industry, an absolute
interpretation of section 2855 may severely impinge on such
agreements.
The view that an employee should be able to contract for an
138. The petition was filed January 16, 1945.
139. Warner Brothers' Petition for Hearing at 20, De Haviland.
140. Id. at 21.
141. Id. at 22.
142. Manchester, No. 81-2134 at 14.
143. See SHEMEL & KRAsIovsY, supra note 26, at 61.
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additional period beyond the seven-year limit of the original
contract, unhampered by section 2855, also finds support in the
unreported 1946 Los Angeles Superior Court case of Autry v.
Republic Productions, Inc. 1' In 1938, singing star Gene Autry
signed a contract with Republic for one year plus four succes-
sive one-year options. In 1942, the parties signed a second
agreement for another one-year term to follow the expiration
of the 1938 contract. 14 From 1942 to 1945, Autry was unable to
provide his services to Republic because he was serving in the
armed forces. 1 6
Autry contended that the second contract was unenforceable
seven years after services were initially rendered under the
first contract. Relying on De Haviland, the court denied en-
forcement of the first contract beyond seven years; 147 however,
the second contract was found enforceable against Autry.
148
The Autry court read section 2855 as limiting enforcement of a
given contract against an employee to seven years:
The law does not provide that a contract of employment may
not be enforced against an employee beyond seven years after
the establishment of the employment relationship between him
and the employer. No public policy exists against the indefi-
nite continuance of that relationship. No public policy exists
against the renewal of employment agreements, period after
period, until the total term of employment exceeds seven
years.
1 49
The court went on to emphasize the importance of the parties'
ability to make long-term plans, a necessary component of
which is the ability of the employee to enter into an enforcea-
ble agreement without having to wait for the earlier agreement
to terminate. The court felt that a contract should not be any
less enforceable because it was entered into the day before ex-
piration of the earlier seven-year agreement than if it were en-
tered into the next day. 50
The Autry court has been criticized for not applying the pro-
employee public policy interpretation of section 2855 mandated
144. No. 503481 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. Jan. 14, 1946).
145. Id. at 5.
146. Id. at 8.
147. Id. at 8.
148. Id. at 3.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 4-5.
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by De Haviland.1 1 This criticism is grounded in the Autry
court's pro-employer resolution of the issue of the enforceabil-
ity of a contract entered into by an employee already re-
strained under an existing contract-a resolution seemingly at
odds with the De Haviland explication of the public policy con-
siderations which should guarantee an open-market break
under section 2855.
VI
Manchester and the Absolutist '5 2 Argument
The court in Manchester reasoned that an absolute view of
the mid-term extension issue under section 2855-that any
mid-term agreement is merely an extension of an existing
agreement and not an independent contract-would impinge
upon the employee's ability to enter into a new contract while
an existing contract was in force.- 3 The Autry court phrased
this same consideration in terms of the value of "permanency
and security" in the employment relationship. 5 4
Under the absolutist view of section 2855, the same criticism
may be applied to both decisions: one of the intentions of sec-
tion 2855 is to impair the employee's ability to enter into a rela-
tionship so "permanent and secure" that it extends more than
seven years into the future. The absolutist view allows the em-
ployee to consider the benefits of a long(er) term relationship,
but free from contractual restraints every seven years. Al-
though it claimed to have interpreted the two contracts "in
light of the policy consideration underlying section 2855 to pro-
tect employees, rather than by principles of formal contract
law,"' 5 the court in Manchester perpetuated a line of reasoning
that arguably allows an employee to waive the seven-year rule
by entering into a new agreement, before the expiration of his
original contract.
The absolutist view-that the employee is actually waiving
section 2855 by means of a mid-term agreement-requires a
reading of the statute in light of the underlying policy ex-
pressed in De Haviland. The statute bars an employee from
151. See Bushkin & Meyer, supra note 53, at 392.
152. See id. at 393-98. The Bushkin and Meyer article is the source of the
"absolutist" interpretation of § 2855.
153. See Manchester, No. CV 81-2134 at 14.
154. See Autry, No. 503481 at 2.
155. Manchester, No. CV 81-2134 at 14.
No. 31
COMM/ENT L. J.
guaranteeing an employer that he will work for him for more
than seven years-the maximum term as directed by the legis-
lature, after which the employee "may make a change [of em-
ployers or occupations] if they deem it necessary or
advisable"156-- even if the employee at an earlier time wished
and attempted to bind himself under a contract for more than
seven years.
However, the statute does read, "[a] contract to render per-
sonal service ... may not be enforced against the employee
beyond seven years from the commencement of service under
it."'1 57 Under a literal reading of section 2855, it could be argued
that the statute refers only to a contract, and a series of agree-
ments would therefore fall outside of the strict reach of the
statute. The absolutist argument, however, provides that if the
policy behind the statute is considered, the series of agree-
ments may be viewed as merely extensions of a contract, by
which an employee should not be "free to throw away the ben-
efits conferred upon [him]."8 The benefit is the guarantee of
a "reasonable opportunity to move upward and to employ his
abilities to the best advantage and for the highest obtainable
compensation."'159
An employee who negotiates a new agreement while under
the restraint of an existing contract is not in a bargaining posi-
tion where he can truly negotiate for the highest obtainable
compensation. The employee does not have the spectrum of
opportunities by which to maximize his worth that he would
have if he were selling his services on the open market. With-
out such an open-market break, under the absolutist approach,
the new agreement cannot be viewed as a truly "new" contract
executed under the conditions guaranteed every seven years,
but rather should be viewed as an extension of the earlier con-
tract.' 60 If the later agreement is given the status of a new con-
156. De Haviland, 67 Cal. App. 2d at 235, 153 P.2d at 988.
157. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 1974) (emphasis added).
158. De Haviland, 67 Cal. App. 2d at 237, 153 P.2d at 989.
159. Id. at 235, 153 P.2d at 988.
160. In Foxx v. Williams, 244 Cal. App. 2d 223, 52 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1966), the California
Court of Appeal implicitly approved the validity of an employment relationship run-
ning more than seven years where there had been open-market breaks. Comedian
Redd Foxx entered into a one-year contract with Dootone Records on January 6, 1956;
Dootone chose not to renew an option for an additional two years. On January 28, 1957,
the parties entered into a similar agreement (but at a higher royalty rate), which ex-
pired after one year because Dootone failed to exercise its option. A third contract was
entered into on April 4, 1958, for a term of five years with a two-year option to extend
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tract starting a new seven-year period, the seven-year
guarantee has effectively been waived by the employee, a prac-
tice which violates the rule that "rights created in the public
interest may not be contravened by private agreement."'
161
While the statute requires more than a literal reading in order
to reach a finding that a series of "contracts" is legally one ex-
tended contract, this gap in the logic of the absolutist view ap-
pears to be adequately supported by the policy bridge of
section 2855.
In Manchester, the 1976 Manchester/Arista one-year option
agreement was entered into and exercised before the expira-
tion of the 1973 contract. Under an absolutist interpretation of
section 2855, there was no open-market break, and the 1976
agreement would be viewed as dependent upon, or a mid-term
extension of, the 1973 contract.
VII
Approaches to the Interpretation of Section 2855
As evidenced by the above discussion, the case law directly
addressing the issue of mid-term agreements under section
2855 is sparse and the commentaries few. As a result, resolu-
tion of this issue depends to a great degree on the policy con-
siderations that underlie the statute and the effects of the
enforcement of the relevant policies.
According to Bushkin and Meyer, there are at least three
possible approaches to interpreting the mid-term extension is-
sue under section 2855.162 The first approach is a pure consider-
the contract. The trial court had ruled that Foxx's failure and refusal to record albums
under the contract merited a nearly two and one-half year extension of the term pursu-
ant to a suspension/extension provision of the third contract. Id. at 237.
The court of appeal held that the third contract was subject to the seven-year limita-
tion, id. at 243, a determination which necessarily upheld the enforceability of the third
contract for seven years, even though the employment relationship had begun nine
years earlier. The court specifically observed that the earlier contracts had expired
before the following agreement was entered into. Id. at 228. While not explicitly stat-
ing that Foxx had been afforded open-market breaks between the contracts, the court
did view each contract as independent and did not measure the seven years from the
beginning of the employment relationship. The third contract was valid up to seven
years after it was entered into. Id. at 243.
161. De Haviland, 67 Cal. App. 2d at 236, 153 P.2d at 988. See also CAL. CrV. CODE
§ 3513 (Deering 1972) (" [a] nyone may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for
his benefit. But a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a pri-
vate agreement.").
162. See Bushkin & Meyer, supra note 53, at 394-96.
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ation test, where any bargain supported by new consideration
would initiate a new seven-year period.163 This approach is in-
consistent with De Haviland and could result in an obvious cir-
cumvention of the statute.
An intermediate balancing approach, similar to that taken by
the Manchester court, requires a case-by-case review of the
specific facts of each case. A court must assess a variety of fac-
tors, including: (1) whether the new agreement is a legitimate
new contract entailing additional consideration and material
alterations of the contract provisions; (2) whether the intent of
the new agreement appears to have been to avoid the stric-
tures of the seven-year rule, which may be indicated by
whether the new contract was entered into at or near the time
of formation of the earlier contract; and (3) the equality of bar-
gaining positions between the employer and employee, indi-
cated by the degree of restraint upon the employee by the
existing contract.
Commentators have noted the possibility that a court may
allow a new bargain to exceed the seven-year period under a
balancing approach:
We think that the court would carefully scrutinize such an ar-
rangement and would consider among other factors, whether
the amendment or new contract was bonafide, whether there
was fairly equal bargaining position between employer and
employee, whether the employee freely elected to extend the
term. Notwithstanding the presence of all these factors, if the
parties simply extended the term and did not materially
change other provisions of the agreement, the seven year rule
may still be applied. However, if it were truly a new arrange-
ment involving additional consideration and other material
changes, and the other requisites just mentioned were present,
the court might well rule that the seven year period could be
exceeded.
164
The Manchester decision evidences judicial acceptance of
this method of interpreting section 2855, which is essentially a
test based on equitable considerations in addition to the requi-
site legal elements. However, the balancing approach has been
criticized as inviting "needless review of an individual's free-
dom, the market value of his services, and the nature of the
163. Id. at 396.
164. Berman & Rosenthal, Enforcement of Personal Service Contracts in the En-
tertainment Industry, Part 2: Measure of Damages and Enforceability Issues, 7 BEV.
Hnas B.J., Nov.-Dec. 1973, at 24, 30-31.
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restraints-all on a case-by-case basis."'165 This necessary de-
gree of judicial inquiry does result in some uncertainty to both
the employer and employee in that it may make the eventual
effect of the written document unpredictable. However, the
balancing approach does allow judicial latitude in determining
the results according to the weight of the equities, as indicated
by the objective and subjective factors found in, and attendant
to, the parties' agreement(s).
The third approach applies the absolutist interpretation to
section 2855.166 It has been defined by Bushkin and Meyer as
"[a]ny subsequent bargain executed under existing contrac-
tual restraints to the employee's freedom, and which therefore
does not give the employee his market worth, is not a 'new con-
tract' under the statute; a 'new contract' thus arises only if the
employee were truly free at the time of contracting.' 1 67 The
employee is thus "absolutely" guaranteed an open-market
break by section 2855.
The absolutist approach is supported by the decision in De
Haviland and is implicitly approved by the California Court of
Appeal decision in Foxx v. Williams.16 These cases support
the argument that the employee is guaranteed an open-market
break every seven years, unaffected by a mid-term agree-
ment.'69 The absolutist rule also provides certainty in deter-
mining the effect of section 2855 on subsequent employment
agreements; any such agreement will not start a new seven-
year period and thus may be unenforceable.
However, that same certainty may potentially lead to inequi-
table results, defeat the purpose of the statute, and deprive the
165. See Bushkin & Meyer, supra note 53, at 396.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 152-61.
167. See Bushkin & Meyer, supra note 53, at 396.
168. See supra note 160.
169. This issue also arose in a dispute between talk show host Johnny Carson and
NBC in 1979-seven years after the signing of Carson's 1972 contract. Carson con-
tended that his contract was unenforceable under § 2855. NBC argued that it had en-
tered into three separate agreements with Carson subsequent to the signing of the
1972 contract. The last agreement gave Carson more money for reduced hours as the
host of The Tonight Show. NBC asserted that Carson was contractually bound until
April 1981. The dispute was submitted to arbitration. See Family Feud. Carson and
NBC Go To Court, TiME, Sept. 24, 1979, at 86.
The dispute was settled by the parties before the arbitration award was handed
down; however, according to one of Carson's attorneys, retired Judge Parks Stillwell
was leaning toward granting summary judgment in favor of Carson. Telephone inter-
view with Rauer Meyer, Esq., Bushkin, Kopelson, Gaims, Gaines & Wolf, in Beverly
Hills (Jan. 31, 1983).
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parties of necessary contractual freedom. If Manchester's ab-
solutist argument-that the 1976 contract was an unenforce-
able extension of a contract beyond seven years-had been
successful, 170 Arista would have been required to pay off
Manchester's $145,000 debt without receiving one year of serv-
ices in exchange.' 7 ' As mentioned earlier, the $145,000 was con-
sidered an advance against Manchester's royalty payments, so
that even if Manchester did not record any more albums for
Arista, the company would recoup its advances against any
royalties accruing from sales of previously recorded records. 72
However, the result could still conceivably be that Arista
would not recoup all of the $145,000 and thus have effectively
given away its money-an apparently inequitable result.
The quid pro quo for the renegotiation of royalty provisions
and fringe benefits is often an extension of the contractual
term. 73 Indeed, more "service time" is often virtually all that
the artist has to offer the employer. If the renegotiated agree-
170. The success of Manchester's claim depended upon characterizing the 1973 and
1976 contracts as one combined employment agreement for purposes of § 2855. In or-
der for the 1976 contract to exceed the seven-year limit, it was necessary to "tack" the
five years that had run on the 1976 contract onto the additional three years from the
1973 contract.
As noted in the text accompanying notes 100-13, the Manchester court found that
even if the 1976 agreement were an extension of the 1973 contract, Manchester could
not prevail because the choice of forum clause in the 1973 contract (specifying New
York law) would then apply to the 1976 contract. The entire combined agreement
would not in that case be subject to California law or § 2855.
In her moving papers, Manchester argued that the parties intentionally omitted the
choice of forum clause from the 1976 "amendment," and therefore the choice of forum
clause in the 1973 contract should not control the 1976 amendment even though the
contracts were combined. Plaintiff's Reply at 26-27, Manchester.
The issue thus presented was: may a California court prevent enforcement of the
1976 agreement that is under California law, but which only violates the seven-year
limit if viewed as an extension of the 1973 agreement that is not subject to the laws of
California? While the issue as framed by Manchester was not addressed by the court,
it raises the question of whether the public policy embodied in § 2855 is strong enough
to protect a California employee in such a "tacking" situation.
A different type of "tacking" was involved in the recent case filed by football player
Fred Dean against the San Francisco 49ers. Dean is claiming that his contracts with
separate employers (the 49ers and the San Diego Chargers) are all one contract, the
total of which exceeds seven years. Therefore, Dean argues, this latest contract with
the 49ers is invalid under § 2855. The case had not gone to trial at the time of this
note's publication. San Francisco Chron., July 19, 1984, at 77, col. 5.
171. The agreement to pay off Manchester's judgment debt was entered into by
Arista at Manchester's request. Declaration of Elliot Goldman in Support of Defend-
ant Arista Record Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss at 6, Manchester.
172. See supra note 95.
173. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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ment extends the term of the employment relationship past
seven years from the commencement of services under the
original contract, the employer may not be able to enforce the
agreement. With such knowledge, the employer may under-
standably be unwilling to bargain away money for an unen-
forceable promise. As a result, the absolutist approach may
effectively limit the artist's "reasonable opportunity to move
upward and employ his abilities to the best advantage and for
the highest obtainable compensation."'174
The problem faced by an artist who can only offer "service
time" as consideration for a needed contractual benefit is illus-
trated in Manchester. It was in the interests of both
Manchester and Arista to shift the employee's debt from her
former record producer to her present record company. Under
the absolutist approach to such a situation, an employer may
be unwilling to "bail out" an employee, knowing that the con-
tract option received in exchange for its payment may not be
enforceable.
Countering the employer's contention that it bargained for
an unenforceable agreement, one may argue that the employer
has the option of terminating the earlier agreement, allowing
the artist a bona fide open-market break, and then re-signing
the artist at the deserved level of compensation and benefits. 5
With such an open-market break, the employer would be as-
sured of his ability to enforce the new contract for a full seven
years. In view of the especially sensitive nature of employ-
ment relations involving artistry, it may benefit the employer
to pay an artist the increase in compensation resulting from
commercial success in order to maintain a satisfying working
relationship.
An employer, however, may balk at the prospect of turning
174. De Haviland, 67 Cal. App. 2d at 235, 153 P.2d at 988. See also Note, supra note
10, at 496 n.36; Bushkin & Meyer, supra note 53, at 394.
175. See Note, supra note 10, at 496 n.36; Bushkin and Meyer, supra note 53, at 396.
Contracting parties have used the "moment of freedom" technique. The rock group
Steely Dan signed new contracts with its record company almost seven years after its
initial contracts. The group signed the contracts and then set the briefcase containing
them down in the record company's office. The record company then signed papers
releasing the group from its earlier contracts. Moments later, the record company
signed the new contracts. CBS Records used the same technique for recording star
Neil Diamond. However, if courts were assessing this situation, they would probably
look to the substance and reality of the situation rather than the form of technical
compliance. Remarks by Donald Biederman, Legal Aspects of the Music Industry
Seminar, at Hastings College of the Law (Nov. 12, 1983).
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his valuable investment loose without the certainty that the
artist will return to the fold. It has been suggested that this
problem may be obviated by a grant of "first refusal" rights176
to the employer-giving the employer the option of being first
in line to pick up the employee's services-at the employee's
open-market worth.
However, in a situation such as in Manchester, where the
term of the second agreement was of short duration, it is un-
likely that the employer, in order to provide an open-market
break, would be willing to terminate a long-term primary con-
tract before entering into the new agreement. As a result, an
artist may be unable to enlist the help of the employer in solv-
ing an immediate problem requiring positive cash flow.
VIII
Proposal for an Interpretive Statutory Provision
An analysis of the Manchester case illustrates the difficulties
involved in applying section 2855, and especially illustrates the
problems that could arise if the statute is "absolutely" applied
to mid-term extensions. 17 An employer may be foreclosed
from enforcing a valid promise supported by consideration and
justifiably relied on. The employer's cognizance of this possi-
bility may prevent an artist, involved in a long-term employ-
ment relationship, from being able to renegotiate terms
(including compensation, royalties, fringe benefits, and artistic
control), or obtain a needed monetary advance in exchange for
an additional period of service. The employer may not wish, or
may be unable, to terminate the earlier agreement in order to
176. See Bushkin & Meyer, supra note 53, at 398.
177. The precedential value of Manchester outside of the Central District of Califor-
nia is uncertain. While California courts are not bound to follow a federal court deci-
sion on matters of state law, Estate of D'India, 63 Cal. App. 3d 942, 948, 134 Cal. Rptr.
165, 168 (1976), federal decisions may have a persuasive effect. Demeter v. Annenson,
80 Cal. App. 2d 48, 53, 180 P.2d 998, 1001 (1947). See also 6 B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCE-
DURE § 674 (2d ed. 1971); 20 AM. JuR. 2d Courts § 225 (1965). In view of the paucity of
applicable case law, Manchester, even though unpublished, may possibly be cited in
future California court cases involving the interpretation of § 2855. The decision was
noted in the Entertainment Law Reporter as one "long awaited by entertainment law-
yers, concerning the effect of [the] seven year limitation on subsequent modifications
of personal service contracts . . . ." ENT. L. REP., supra note 12, at 1. A prominent
entertainment attorney, however, has stated that the § 2855 analysis in Manchester
might be a gratuitous statement and possibly not the "law." Remarks by Jay Cooper,
Legal Aspects of the Music Industry Seminar, supra note 175.
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provide an open-market break between a primary long-term
contract and a supplementary short-term contract.
Nevertheless, the absolutist approach appears to be the cor-
rect method of interpreting section 2855 in most situations. It
provides the employee with the greatest degree of protection
against being bound to a long-term contract that does not pro-
vide compensation commensurate with his ability. And it ap-
pears to reflect the pro-employee purpose of section 2855 as
defined in De Haviland, that is, to give the employee the oppor-
tunity to freely negotiate for his fair market value every seven
years.
However, the absolutist approach will not provide the correct
result in all situations. Such a mechanical application of the
statute, while providing certainty to the contracting parties,
could lead to inequitable results. Even the promise of cer-
tainty may dissipate as a judge "creatively" interprets the con-
tract or statute in order to avoid an unjust resolution of a
contract' dispute.
The rationale for the absolutist approach is that a subse-
quent bargain executed under existing contractual restraints
does not give the employee his market worth.'78 But what if
the employee has received his market worth by almost any-
one's standards? Arguably, the purpose of the statute has al-
ready been met. The reason for giving the employee an open-
market break is to remove the employer's dominance rooted in
the existing contract and to allow the employee to actually use
the bargaining strength built up by his accumulation of seven
years of skill and knowledge-in other words, to promote
equalization of the parties' bargaining positions. However, an
employee who has renegotiated a contract from a bargaining
posture equal to, or greater than, the employer's does not need
the statute, and should not be able to mechanically apply sec-
tion 2855 and escape from a contract which was renegotiated
and extended on very favorable terms. The same equities ap-
pear to apply in a case such as Manchester, where the contract,
while involving the artist's services (and extension of the
term) as part of the consideration, was entered into for a valid
purpose 179 separate from the original contract.
The resulting problem is that while the statute should be
178. See supra text accompanying note 167.
179. See supra text accompanying note 94.
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strictly applied in most circumstances, there is a threshold
point where the imposition of section 2855 on an otherwise
valid contractual arrangement brings inequitable results.
A possible solution may be to add an interpretive provision
to section 2855. The absolutist approach and the intermediate
balancing test could be combined in a rebuttable presumption,
similar to that embodied in California Labor Code section
2750.5.180 Section 2750.5 creates a rebuttable presumption, af-
fecting the burden of proof, that a worker performing certain
services is an employee rather than an independent contractor.
It asigns the evidentiary burden to the employer on the issue
of whether the worker can invoke the protections of the Labor
Code. The statute then presents a detailed list of factors (basi-
cally elements of a balancing test) which must be proved by
the employer in order to overcome the presumption and estab-
lish that the worker is an independent contractor. 81
180. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.5 (Deering Supp. 1984).
181. Section 2750.5 states:
There is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof that a
worker performing services for which a license is required pursuant to Chap-
ter 9 (commencing with Section 7000) of Division 3 of the Business and Profes-
sions Code, or who is performing such services for a person who is required to
obtain such a license is an employee rather than an independent contractor.
Proof of independent contractor status includes satisfactory proof of these fac-
tors:
(a) That the individual has the right to control and discretion as to the
manner of performance of the contract for services in that the result of the
work and not the means by which it is accomplished is the primary factor bar-
gained for.
(b) That the individual is customarily engaged in an independently estab-
lished business.
(c) That the individual's independent contractor status is bona fide and
not a subterfuge to avoid employee status. A bona fide independent contrac-
tor status is further evidenced by the presence of cumulative factors such as
substantial investment other than personal services in the business, holding
out to be in business for oneself, bargaining for a contract to complete a spe-
cific project for compensation by project rather than by time, control over the
time and place the work is performed, supplying the tools or instrumentalities
used in the work other than tools and instrumentalities normally and custom-
arily provided by employees, hiring employees, performing work that is not
ordinarily in the course of the principal's work, performing work that requires
a particular skill, holding a license pursuant to the Business and Professions
Code, the intent by the parties that the work relationship is of an independent
contractor status, or that the relationship is not severable or terminable at will
by the principal but gives rise to an action for breach of contract.
In addition to the factors contained in subdivisions (a), (b), and (c), any
person performing any function or activity for which a license is required pur-
suant to Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 7000) of Division 3 of the Busi-
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Similarly, a rebuttable presumption could be employed to
assign the burden of proof as to whether a renegotiated,
amended, or modified contract, which extends the contractual
term, is in fact a new contractual arrangement starting a new
seven-year period under section 2855. The statute could read:
There is a rebuttable presumption affecting the bur-
den of proof that an agreement renegotiated, ex-
tended, or modified while the employee is under an
existing contract with that employer, and which in-
volves an extension of the term of the employment re-
lationship, is considered a mid-term extension of the
existing contract for the purposes of Labor Code sec-
tion 2855. Proof that the renegotiated, amended, or
modified agreement is sufficient to begin a new seven-
year period includes satisfactory proof of these factors:
(1) whether the new agreement is a bonafide new con-
tract, entailing (a) additional consideration, and
(b) material alterations of the contract provisions;
(2) whether the intent of the new agreement appears
to have been to avoid the strictures of the seven-year
rule, which may be indicated by whether the new con-
tract was entered into at or near the time of formation
of the earlier contract; and (3) the equality of bargain-
ing positions between the employer and employee, in-
dicated by (a) the substance of restraint upon the
employee due to the existing contract and (b) the con-
tractual benefits accorded the employee as measured
by current industry standards.
Such a statute, in most cases, would ensure the employee
the benefits of the absolutist interpretation of the mid-term ex-
tension issue, while also recognizing that there are situations
where mechanical application of the statute would be unfair to
the employer. However, it places the burden on the employer
to prove that the new agreement is fair enough to the employee
so that it should be considered a new contract starting another
seven-year period.
ness and Professions Code shall hold a valid contractors' license as a condition
of having independent contractor status.
For purposes of workers' compensation law, this presumption is a supple-
ment to the existing statutory definitions of employee and independent con-
tractor, and is not intended to lessen the coverage of ... employees under
Division 4 and Division 5.
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The employee will thus be afforded the protection of section
2855 unless the employer can present satisfactory evidence
that the employee should not be allowed to break the renegoti-
ated agreement by virtue of section 2855. Matters of proof may
be problematic due to the subjective nature of parts of this pro-
posed provision. Since judges may lack an expert understand-
ing of the entertainment industry, expert opinion may be
required to determine the relative bargaining positions of the
parties and how fair the contract was to the employee. As with
other expert opinions, this would entail a certain amount of
subjectivity and would require a great deal of factual informa-
tion and add to the expense of litigation. An even greater prob-
lem would be that the contracting parties may be less certain
of the effect of mid-term extensions. 82 However, even though
an absolute rule would provide a greater degree of certainty, a
court may be hesitant to strictly apply the seven-year rule if
the result would be incorrect or unjust, and thus might likely
bend such a rule. The rebuttable presumption suggested
above would allow a judge to avoid applying section 2855 with-
out having to justify his decision through tortured reasoning.
Such an interpretation of section 2855 also allows for a situa-
tion such as in Manchester where the artist exchanges a period
of service for the payment of a debt. In this situation, the art-
ist's ability to obtain such an advance on the open market is
probably very slim and the resulting agreement should be
viewed as a new contract under the proposed statutory provi-
sion and section 2855.
IX
Conclusion
The proposed statutory provision leaves intact section 2855's
renunciation of contracts whose terms have run for more than
seven years, as well as section 2855's prohibition of suspen-
sion/extension clauses that extend the maximum period.'83
The proposal does, however, affect the analysis of mid-term ex-
tensions under section 2855 by establishing that the seven-year
period is presumed to run from the date of the original contract
182. See Bushkin & Meyer, supra note 53, at 396 (criticism of a balancing approach
to § 2855 mid-term extensions, which would apply equally to the balancing approach
embodied in the proposed statutory provision).
183. See infra text accompanying notes 73-91.
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regardless of renegotiations, unless legal requirements and
considerations of fairness mandate otherwise.
The mid-term extension issue should always be viewed
through the strong pro-employee perspective embodied in the
Labor Code,18 4 inherent in section 2855, and articulated in the
De Haviland decision. In most cases, the "absolutist" ap-
proach is correct, and the renegotiated agreement should not
start a new seven-year period. However, the rationale for the
absolutist approach is that the employee has not achieved his
market worth in the renegotiation because of existing contrac-
tual restraints. The proposed provision gives courts a degree
of flexibility in an otherwise absolute rule in cases where an
artist's market worth has been achieved.
184. See Frackman, supra note 10, at 349.
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